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1. INTRODUCTION 
This case between American Bank, a Montana banking corporation, and WadswOlih Golf 
Construction Company of the Southwest ("WadswOlih"), a Delaware corporation having its 
principal place of business in Arizona, will test the constitutional limitations of the Idaho 
Contractor Registration Act ("ICRA"), Idaho Code § 54-5201, et seq. Wadsworth submits that 
the application of the ICRA as urged by American Bank will violate AIiicle XIII, § 6 of the 
Idaho Constitution. Wadsworth submits that the application of the ICRA as used by the District 
Court meets the constitutional standards. When a statute may be applied in two manners, one of 
which would be in violation of the Constitution and the other not, the Court is obligated to use an 
application ofthe statute that upholds its constitutionality. 
This case also presents a question of first impression in Idaho law, being whether or not 
relative lien priority has any relevance after an order has been entered releasing the claim of lien 
on the basis of the filing of a lien bond. Wadsworth submits that the District Court correctly 
found that after the entry of an order releasing the lien for all purposes, relative lien priority is no 
longer a relevant issue. 
Lastly, Wadsworth submits that the District Court did commit error when it found that 
Wadsworth had waived its right to lien for $343,985.00 in unpaid retainage or assuming, 
arguendo, that the District Court was correct in finding that Wadsworth had waived its lien rights 
for retain age up to the date ofthe last BRN lien release form being March 19, 2008 in the sum of 
$257,043.00, the District COUli erred in finding that Wadsworth waived lien rights for retainage 
subsequent to that date in the additional sum of $86,942.00. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Wadsworth accepts American Bank's discussion of the course of proceedings with the 
following additions: 
1. AmeIican Bank named as Defendants in its original Complaint, various mortgage 
holders and eleven lien claimants. Clerk's Record ("R"), Vol. 1, pp. 110-133. Later, a twelfth 
lien claimant, ACI Northwest, Inc. ("ACI") was added to this action. 
2. AmeIican Bank petitioned for the release of the WadswOlih lien on April 14, 
2010. R, Vol. 4, pp. 670-762. 
3. Wadsworth and American Bank stipulated to the entry of an order releasing not 
only the Wadsworth claim of lien, but also the liens of the Turf Corporation and Precision 
Irrigation. The order was entered on April 27, 2010. Transcript on Appeal ("Tr."), p. 8, R, Vol. 
4, pp. 774-776. 
4. Subsequently, American Bank obtained the release of the ACI lien, but never 
obtained the release of the other eight liens oflien claimants. 
5. On February 2, 2011, upon cross-motions for paIiial summary judgment, the 
District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order finding that by American Bank 
posting the lien release bond and the Court having entered its order releasing of record and in its 
entirety and for all purposes, the Wadsworth claim of lien, the issue of lien priority was no 
longer relevant. The Court ordered the parties to trial on remaining issues of the validity and 
amount ofthe Wadsworth claim oflien. R, Vol. 11, pp. 2727-2745, at 2742-2743. 
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6. On April 28, 2011, American Bank and Wadsworth filed their Stipulated Findings 
of Fact for the purposes of the May 2,2011 trial. R, Vol. 12, pp. 3004-3014. The parties agreed 
that the principal sum owing to Wadsworth was $2,329,439.00. R, Vol. 12, p. 3010. 
7. In connection with Wadsworth's work on the project, Wadsworth submitted to 
BRN Development, Inc. ("BRNff), the owner of the property, 25 payment applications. Six of 
those payment applications were accompanied by a BRN prepared lien release form. The 
balance of the payment applications were accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared lien release 
form. The parties stipulated that the amount of unpaid retainage that had accrued to the effective 
date of the last BRN lien release fonTI, that being March 19,2008, was $257,043.00, which was 
included within the $2,329,439.00 that Wadsworth sought to recover. R, Vol. 12, p. 3009. 
8. The parties fmiher stipulated that the total amount of retainage which Wadsworth 
sought to recover is the sum of$343,985.00. R, Vol. 12, p. 3009. 
9. On May 2 and 3, 2011, the District Court held a two-day bench trial on the 
remaining issue of the validity and amount of the Wadsworth claim oflien. Tr., pp. 143-376. 
10. On August 22, 2011, the District Comi entered its Memorandum Decision, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Following Comi Trial. R, Vol. 13, pp. 3207-
3246. In that Memorandum Decision, the Court reduced the $2,329,439.00 sought by 
Wadsworth by the amount of$139,756.94 as an amount that Wadsworth sought to recover to pay 
for unpaid work perfonned by an unregistered subcontractor, and further reduced the Wadsworth 
claim by $343,985.00, representing an amount that the District Court found Wadsworth had 
either waived or been contractually obligated to waive for retainage, resulting in a principal 
,., 
.,) 
judgment as against the bond posted in this matter in the sum of$1,845,697.78. R, Vol. 13, pp. 
3241-3242. 
11. On October 6, 2011, the District COUli entered its Memorandum Opinion 
regarding Wadsworth's Motion for Order Detennining Prejudgment Interest and Settling 
Attorney Fees. R, Vol. 14, pp. 3336-3348. On the basis that Wadsworth prevailed on its claim 
oflien in the amount of79.2% of the claimed amount, the District COUli awarded to Wadsworth, 
79.2% of its claimed attorney's fees in the sum of $208,417.47. The District Court further 
awarded WadswOlih prejudgment interest in the sum of$371,368.82. 
12. On that same day, the Court entered its Judgment and LR.C.P. 54(b) Certificate 
which awarded to Wadswolih a total judgment of$2,425,484.70. R, Vol. 14, pp. 3349-3355. 
13. On November 14, 2011, American Bank filed a Notice of Appeal. R, Vol. 13, pp. 
3368-3379, and on December 2, 2011, Wadsworth filed a Notice of Cross AppeaL Clerk's 
Supplemental Record on Appeal, Vol. 10, pp. 2145-2149. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wadsworth accepts American Bank's Statement of Facts with the following additions: 
1. Wadsworth has been licensed to be a contractor in the State ofIdaho since 2000. 
Tr., pp. 215-216. DUling the course of negotiations between Wadsworth and BRN during the 
late summer and fall of2006, it came to Wadsworth's attention that the WadswOlih Idaho license 
was limited to public works and that WadswOlih would need to acquire an additional 
registration. Tr., pp. 215-216. As soon as Wadsworth learned that an additional license or 
registration was necessary, it took all necessary steps to meet the requirements. Tr., p. 217. 
4 
Wadsworth never acted with the intent to evade the tenus of the ICRA. Tr., pp. 217-218. 
Exhibit M is the Idaho Public Works Contractor License Confim1ation showing initial issuance 
of December 26, 2000 and an expiration date of January 31, 2007. Exhibit N is the Idaho 
Contractor's Registration Confirmation showing a registration date of January 9,2007. 
2. BRN prepared a Conditional Letter of Intent dated September 18, 2006 and 
transmitted it to Wadsworth. Wadsworth executed the Conditional Letter of Intent and returned 
it to BRN. Kyle Capps, on behalf of BRN, executed the Conditional Letter of Intent on or about 
October 10, 2006. Exhibit B. 
3. While Wadsworth and BRN continued to negotiate the terms of a final contract, 
as an accommodation to BRN in order to meet the projected construction schedule, Wadsworth 
commenced perfonuing some work on the basis of the Conditional Letter of Intent. Tr., pp. 218-
219. 
4. Prior to the finalization of the final contract between Wadsworth and BRN, 
Wadsworth submitted to BRN, two applications for payment with the second application being 
revised. Exhibits 4, 5, and 6. Each of these applications for payments contained a Lien Release 
on a fom1 utilized by Wadsworth and developed pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute, § 33-1008. 
In its entirety, the first such conditional waiver stated as follows: 
CONDITIONAL WAIVER AND RELEASE ON PROGRESS PAYMENT 
(Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1008) 
Project: Black Rock Development, Inc. 
Job No.: 217-01 
On receipt by the undersigned of a check from Black Rock Development, Inc. in the sum of 
$38250.00 payable to Wadsworth Golf Construction Company and when the check has been 
properly endorsed and has been paid by the bank on which it was drawn, this document becomes 
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effective to release any mechanics' lien, any state or federal statutory bond right, and private bond 
right, any claim for payment and any rights under any similar ordinance, rule or statute related to 
claim or payment rights for persons in the undersigned's position that the undersigned has on the 
job of Black Rock North Golf Course located at Black Rock North Golf Course in Coeur d'Alene, 
ID to the following extent. This release covers a progress payment for all labor, services, 
equipment or materials furnished to the jobsite or to Black Rock North Golf Course through 
October 31, 2006 only and does not cover any retention, pending modification and changes or 
items furnished after that date. Before any recipient of this document relies on it, that person 
should verifY evidence of payment to the undersigned. 
The undersigned warrants that he either has already paid or will use the monies he receives from 
this progress payment to promptly pay in full all of his laborers, subcontractors, materialmen and 
suppliers for all work, materials, equipment or services provided for or to the above referenced 
project up to the date of tIlls waiver. 
DATED: October 31,2006 
Exhibit 3, Page 5, Instructions Omitted 
Wadsworth Golf Construction 
Company 
BY :.=s/-:---::~--:-:-~--:-:--__ 
Stephen HatTell, President 
5. The final contract between Wadsworth and BRN was executed on or subsequent 
to January 27, 2007. R, Vol. 12, pp. 3006-3007. Admitted as the first page of Exhibit 1 is a 
transmittal letter from BRN to Wadsworth enclosing the final contract dated January 27, 2007. 
The contract provided: 
As a prerequisite for any payment, Subcontractor (Wadsworth) shall provide, in a 
form satisfactory to owner, partial lien releases, claim waivers, and affidavits of 
payment fi'om Subcontractor, and its subcontractors and suppliers of any tier, for 
the billed portion of Subcontractor's work." (Emphasis added). 
The contract also provided for retainage in the anlOunt of 5%. Exhibit 1, p. 5. 
6. The contract had attached to it as an exhibit a sample of a lien release form as 
prepared by BRN. Exhibit 1, p. 25. 
7. As stated above, the first two payment applications were each accompanied by a 
Wadsworth prepared lien release fonn. Exhibit 3, p. 5; Exhibit 5, p. 5. These applications were 
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paid by BRN. Tr., Vol. 12, p. 3008. The third payment application was dated February 28,2007 
and was the first payment application made by Wadsworth after the execution of the final 
contract. This application was accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared lien release fonn which 
through clerical enor, misidentified the project as being the Ridge Creek Golf Course. Exhibit 6, 
p.7. When this mistake was discovered, the lien release fonn was replaced by a BRN prepared 
lien release fonn, Exhibit 29, and was paid by BRN. 
8. The fourth payment application was accompanied by a WadswOlth prepared lien 
release form and it was paid by BRN. Exhibit 7, p. 2; Tr., Vol. 12, p. 3008. 
9. The fifth payment application was accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared lien 
release form and it was paid by BRN. Exhibit 8, p. 17; Tr., Vol. 12, p. 3008. 
10. The sixth payment application was not accompanied by a WadswOlth prepared 
lien release fonn. Exhibit 9. When this oversight was discovered, BRN prepared its lien release 
form, Exhibit 30, and application was then paid. Tr., Vol. 12, p. 3008. 
11. The seventh payment application was accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared lien 
release form and it was paid by BRN. Exhibit 10, p. 12; Tr., Vol. 12, p. 3008. 
12. The eighth payment application was accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared lien 
release form and it was paid by BRN. Exhibit 12, p. 13; Tr., Vol. 12, p. 3008. 
13. Wadsworth failed to include its lien release form in its ninth and tenth payment 
applications, Exhibits 12 and 13, and when these oversights were discovered, BRN proposed to 
pay a portion of the cumulative sum of these payment applications and prepared its lien release 
forms, Exhibits 31 and 32. When BRN proposed to pay the balance of the cumulative sum of the 
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ninth and tenth payment applications, it did so upon preparing its lien release fonn for that 
balance. Exhibit 33. 
14. Both the eleventh and twelfth payment applications were accompanied by 
Wadsworth prepared lien release forms and were paid by BRN. Exhibit 14, p. 6; Exhibit 15, 
p. 14; R, VoL 12, p. 3008. 
15. The thirteenth, fOUlieenth, and fifteenth payment applications were not 
accompanied by a Wadswolih prepared lien release form. Exhibits 16, 17, and 18. 
16. The Wadsworth sixteenth payment application was accompanied by a Wadsworth 
prepared lien release fonn. Exhibit 19, p. 6. BRN proposed, however, to cumulatively pay the 
thirteenth through sixteenth payment applications with one payment and thus prepared its lien 
release form in the amount ofthe cumulative payment. Exhibit 34. 
17. The seventeenth and eighteenth payment applications were accompanied by the 
Wadsworth prepared lien release forms and were paid by BRN. Exhibit 20, p. 8; Exhibit 21, 
p.15. 
18. The nineteenth payment application was not accompanied by any lien release 
fom1 but was paid by BRN in full. Exhibit 22. 
19. The twentieth payment application was accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared 
lien release fonn and was paid by BRN. Exhibit 23, p. 16. 
20. While the twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-third payment applications all 
were accompanied by Wadsworth prepared lien release fonns, Exhibit 24, p. 42; Exhibit 25, p. 6; 
and Exhibit 26, p. 8, payment applications twenty-four and twenty-five were not accompanied by 
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any lien release fonns. BRN made a paIiial payment on the twenty-first payment application but 
made no further payments to Wadsworth. 
21. The only times that a BRN prepared lien release fonn was used was when the 
WadswOlih payment application either did not include the Wadsworth prepared lien release fonn 
with the application, when BRN was proposing to pay an amount different than the amount of 
the payment applications and Wadsworth prepared lien release fonns, or when on that one 
occasion, the Wadsworth prepared lien release fonn mistakenly misidentified the name of the 
project. Tr., pp.289-290. When the BRN fonns were sent to Wadsworth, Mr. Harrell, the 
President ofWadswOlih, would execute them with the understanding that there was no difference 
between the two fonns. Tr., pp. 288-289. In discussing the BRN lien release forms, counsel for 
American Bank asked Mr. Harrell the following question and received the following response: 
Q. And now are you saying that when you signed this one, you had 
your hands crossed behind your back; you didn't really mean it? 
A. The contract provided for us to submit a lien release that was 
acceptable to BRN. On numerous occasions, we supplied/provided 
the Arizona -- the Wadsworth -- the other lien release, and it was 
accepted and payment was made based on that lien release. When 
those can1e, I signed them. I did not understand that they were 
different than what I would -- what I had signed originally. At Tr., 
p.283. 
22. Further Testimony by Mr. HaITell was as follows: 
MR. ANSON: 
I would stipulate that on occasion - and Exhibit 12 is an example - that 
Wadsworth neglected to include a lien release with the application. There's at 
least one occasion that I think - maybe two or three occasions - where that 
occurred. 
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BY MR. PETER,\1AN: 
Q. So do you agree with that premise? 
A. I agree with that. 
Q. So on those occasions when you would not send in - when Wadsworth 
Golf would not send in a lien release, it's those occasions that BRN would 
prepare the golden lien release and send it back to you? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you signed it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't really intend to be bound by it, you just signed it, then you 
sent it back. Why would you send it back if you didn't intend to be bound 
by it? 
A. I didn't understand that there was a difference between the two lien 
releases, so I signed it thinking that they were doing the same thing. 
Q. And that's the extent of your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p. 313,1. 6 - p. 314, L 8) 
23. The contract between BRN and Wadsworth provided for retain age. Retainage 
was withholding of 5% of the amount of the pay request until the project was completed and any 
warranty issues had been corrected. Tr., p. 342. By mutual mistake, at the beginning of the 
project, 10% of the amount of the pay request was being retained instead of 5%. Tr., p. 342. 
\\Then the mistake was discovered, BRN made a payment to Wadsworth for that excessive 
amount. Tr., p. 342. BRN made the payment reimbursing WadswOlih for excessive retainage on 
March 3, 2008 in the sum of$244,557.90. Tr., pp. 240-241. 
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24. Fmiher testimony by Mr. RalTel1 was as follows: 
Q. Okay. We have had conversations, testimony, argument, regarding a lien 
release fonn prepared by Black Rock or BRN Development, which 
American Bank likes to refer to as a gold release, and I can't quite come to 
call it a golden release. I call it the black release. Are you familiar with 
that form that I'm discussing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in this case, WadswOlih would make various applications for 
progress payments with a Wadsworth prepared lien release form? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, the contract. Exhibit 1, has stapled to it the black lien release form, 
but as we saw during counsel's opening statement when he had the portion 
of Exhibit 1 on the screen that the contract didn't real1y say you have to 
use the black lien release fonn; the contract said that you had to use a form 
satisfactory to BRN. Is that your understanding? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. And in your first two applications, Wadsworth used the Wadsworth lien 
release fonn. Is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And did BRN every voice any objection to you as to not using the black 
fonn? 
A. No, they did not. 
Q. Did they pay those first applications? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Did you then assume that they were accepting the use of the Wadsworth 
fonn? 
A. I did assume that. 
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Q. Now, the Wadsworth form explicitly says that it IS not waiving or 
releasing any right to retainage. Is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And was that your understanding of the form you intended to use for lien 
releases that you would not be waiving claims for retainage? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. And your progress payments that Wadsworth would submit, was there a 
portion that was retained and not paid? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Tr. p. 237, 1. 22 - p. 239, 1. 20. 
25. Further, in discussing the lien releases and retainage, Mr. Harrell testified as 
follows: 
Q. Did Black Rock ever indicate to you that Wadsw0l1h was not entitled to 
retainage? 
A. No, they never indicated that. 
Q. And did, in fact, Black Rock pay to Wadsw011h an amount to compensate 
Wadsworth for the excess retainage that was erroneously retained? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Why did you execute the black lien release fom1s? 
A. I didn't know that there was a difference between the black lien release 
form and the Wadsworth lien release fOill1. 
Q. And it was your intent to execute a form that had the effect of the 
Wadsworth prepared form? 
A. That was my intention. 
Q. Did Wadsworth receive anything in addition to the 95 percent of the 
progress payment for signing the black lien release fOill1? 
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MR. PETERMAN: I'm sorry. Could I hear that question again? 
MR. ANSON: I probably can't do it exactly the same. 
(Question read back.) 
THE WITNESS: No, we did not. 
(Tr., p. 242, 1. 8 - p. 243,1. 8) 
26. Mr. Kyle Capps was project manager for BRN. Tr., p. 324. 
27. In discussing retainage and the BRN prepared lien release fom1, Mr. Capps 
testified as follows: 
Q. That from my understanding is an accurate description. 
Now, I'd like you to read out loud the first paragraph of Exhibit 32. 
A. "Upon receipt of payment of the sum of $1 million, the undersigned 
waives any and all right to any lien whatever and releases all rights to lien 
or claim any lien against the real property associated with the above 
project by the undersigned in connection with any and all work or labor 
performed, materials, equipment, goods or things supplied or furnished or 
any other claims or obligations owed through the date shown above on the 
above-named project." 
Q. Okay. Now, the last portion of that paragraph" ... or any other claims or 
obligations owed through the date shown above on the above project. .. " is 
it your understanding that that paragraph was intended to waive any claim 
by Wadsworth for any retainage held prior to the date of that release? 
A. I honestly don't know the true meaning or what the purpose of that is. I 
didn't write this, and I'm not going to assume what exactly all that means. 
Q. Okay. But your understanding, from at least my understanding of your 
testimony, that notwithstanding what this document mayor may not say, 
BRN Development intended to pay to Wadsworth the amount of the 
retainage at the successful completion of the project? 
A. That's correct. I would expect that they would be compensated for the 
retainage withheld when they completed the project, yes. 
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Q. And BRN Development never took the posltlOn that Wadsworth, by 
signing documents like Exhibit 32, had waived or released any claim for 
retainage. Is that right? 
A. I never took that position. That's correct. 
Q. And, in fact, I believe it was in March of '08 that BRN Development paid 
to Wadsworth that surplus retain age. I don't know if you have a 
recollection of the date, but it's my understanding that's what the record 
establishes. 
A. Yeah. And I don't recall the date, but I do recall some type of pay-down 
of the amount of retention at that point in time. 
Q. All right. And had BRN Development been taking the position that the 
Black Rock North lien waivers waived the right of retainage, they would 
not have made that payment, which I believe was in excess of $200,000. 
Is that right? 
A. I would assume so, but I can't speak for the guy deciding to make the 
payment. That wasn't my decision. 
Tr. p. 343, 1. 20 - p. 345, 1.,25. Mr. Harrell further testified that he never intended to waive 
Wadsworth's right to retention or any lien rights for retention. Tr., p. 292. 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Wadsworth submits that the following additional issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court erred in finding that Wadsworth waived all lien rights 
for retain age in the sum of $343,985.00. 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that Wadsworth waived lien rights for retain age up to the 
date of the last BRN prepared lien release fonn in the sum of $257,043.00, the District COUli 
erred in finding that Wadsworth waived lien rights for retainage subsequent to that date in the 
sum of$86,942.00 (being the difference between $343,985.00 and $257,043.00). 
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3. As attorney fees, costs, and interest were awarded by the District Court on the 
percentage basis of Wadsworth's recovery as compared to the amount of its claim, those awards 
should be adjusted in the event that this Court finds that Wadsworth had not waived all lien 
lights for retain age in the sum of $343,985.00, or alternatively had not waived lien rights for 
retain age subsequent to the execution of the last BRN prepared lien release form in the sum of 
$86,942.00. 
4. Whether Wadsworth is entitled to an award ofattomey's fees and costs on appeal 
pursuantto Idaho Code § 45-513 and § 45-522. 
v. ARGUMENT 
1. The Priority Between the American Bank Mortgage and the Wadsworth Claim of 
Lien Is No Longer Relevant by the Filing of the Bond by American Bank. 
American Bank had a choice. It could litigate lien priority in the foreclosure action. 
Alternatively, it could deal with the property free and clear of the Wadsworth lien by the posting 
of the bond. It chose the latter course of action. By doing so, it removed the issue of lien 
pliority. American Bank elected to trade the opportunity of litigating lien priority for the 
opportunity of dealing with the property free of the Wadsworth claim oflien. 
The April 27, 2010 Order Releasing Claim of Lien states that the lien claims of 
Wadsworth, Turf Corporation, and Precision Irrigation "are hereby released of record for all 
purposes, but only as to the real property described in Exhibit D, to the same extent as if such 
liens had been released of record by Wadsworth, Turf Corporation, and Precision, respectively, 
and if such claims are asserted by motion pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-523 or in an independent 
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action pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-522, the bond filed herein shall be subject to the claims that 
would otherwise constitute liens against the above-desclibed property." R, Vol. 4, pp. 774-891, 
at 776. 
The Release of Mechanic's Lien Bond filed in this action states that American Bank and 
Intemational Fidelity Insurance Company do obligate themselves to Wadsworth under the 
conditions descIibed by Idaho Code § 45-518 through Idaho Code § 45-524, in the sum of 
$3,494,159.58, "from which sum they will pay the claimant [Wadsworth] such amount as a court 
of competent juIisdiction may adjudge to have been secured by his lien, with interest, costs and 
attomey's fees." R, Vol. 4, p. 699. The language set forth in the bond is the statutorily 
prescIibed language set forth in Idaho Code § 45-519. The language in the Order is similar to 
the language contained in Idaho Code § 45-521 which states as follows: 
(1) Upon the hearing, the court shall enter its order releasing the 
mechanic's lien upon the petitioner's filing in open court the original bond, and 
introducing into evidence a receipt for payment ofthe premium. 
(2) The entry of the order by the court must refer to the property which 
is the subject of the lien and the lien itself, by instrument number, and must recite 
that the lien is release of record for all purposes to the same extent as if released 
of record by the lienor. 
(3) Upon entry of the order, the lien is released of record in its entirety 
and for all purposes and the real property, the subject of the lien, is released from 
the encumbrances of the lien. 
(4) There is no appeal from the entry 0 f an order pursuant to the 
provisions of this section and upon entry the order is final for all purposes. 
Likewise, Idaho Code § 45-522 in relevant part states: 
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(1) The lien claimant is entitled to bring an action against the lien 
claimant's debtor and to join therein the surety on the bond. The rights of the lien 
claimant include and the court may award to him in that action: 
(a) The amount found due to the lien claimant by the comi; 
(b) The costs of preparing and filing the lien claim, including 
attorney's fees, if any; 
(c) The costs ofthe proceedings; 
Cd) Attorney's fees for representation of the lien claimant in the 
proceedings; and 
(e) Interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum on the 
amount found due to the lien claimant and from the date 
found by the court that the sum was due and payable. 
There is no mention in Idaho Code § 45-518 through § 45-524 of any determination of 
lien priority. This is because pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-521, the lien has been released of 
record in its entirety and for all purposes. As the District Court correctly noted, it is difficult to 
prioritize a lien that no longer exists of record. R, Vol. 11, p. 2740. 
To collect upon the bond, Wadsworth was required to prove that it had a valid lien and 
the amount of the lien. To prove that it had a valid lien, Wadsworth established that it had a right 
to lien under Idaho Code § 45-501 and that the claim oflien was both timely and in compliance 
with Idaho Code § 45-507. There is nothing that required Wadsworth to establish its lien 
priority. Lien priority has nothing to do with lien validity. The most junior lien is of equal 
validity to the most senior lien. A lien is valid even if there is no equity in the propeliy to satisfy 
the lien. While Wadswolih was required to prove that it would have been entitled to judgment 
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against the propeliy, there is nothing that required Wadsworth to prove that it could have 
satisfied the judgment through foreclosure sale of the propeliy. 
When a lien is discharged by the filing of a bond, the property is discharged from the lien 
and the lien is shifted to the bond. TO. IX v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 (2008); 
Washington International Insurance Company v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 271 Ga.App. 50, 609 
S.E.2d 99 (2005); A1artirano Construction COlp. v. Briar Contracting Corporation, 481 N YS.2d 
105 (1984). In such cases, the action, although in essence is one to foreclose the lien, actually 
becomes one to test the validity of the lien had it not been discharged. If the lien is found to be 
valid, a judgment is obtained against the bond rather than a judgment of foreclosure against the 
property. Lindt & Sprungli USA, Inc. v. PR Painting COlp., 740 N.Y.S.2d 369 (2002); Brunet v. 
Justice, 264 So.2d 743 (La.App., 1972); FEW v. Capitol Materials, Inc., 274 Ga. 784, 559 
S.E.2d 429 (2002); and DMB Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company, 142 Wash. App. 35, 170 P.3d 592 (2007). 
In most instances involving lien release bonds, the detelmination of the validity of the 
lien and the amount of the lien will be made at an earlier point in time than any resolution of a 
foreclosure proceeding, or may be made in lieu of a foreclosure proceeding. In those instances, 
it would be an exercise of speculation to attempt to determine the existence of any equity in the 
property to satisfy the lien. 
Vv'bile Idaho has not yet had the oppoliunity to rule on this issue, other jurisdictions have, 
and with one exception, all have found that lien priority is not a proper consideration in 
determining whether or not a lien is valid. 
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In Gelder & Associates, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 34 
N.C.App. 731,239 S.E.2d 604 (1977) the bond statute and the bond itself were extremely similar 
to the bond and statute in this case. The bond statute provided for the posting of a bond to 
discharge the lien from the real propelty with the bond to be used to pay the an10unt found due 
upon the lien. Like the bond in this case, the bond in Gelder was an unconditional obligation to 
pay to the claimant the amount found due by the Court. The Defendant contended that the lien 
would have been foreclosed and therefore no payment should be made under the bond. The 
Court disagreed, stating: 
Defendant contends that the bond was intended solely to secure whatever rights 
plaintiff had by virtue of the lien on the land, that it was not intended to give 
plaintiff any greater security than it originally had by virtue of the lien and that, 
since the foreclosure of the propeliy would have extinguished plaintiffs lien had 
not the bond been executed, the foreclosure cancelled defendant's obligations 
under the bond. Defendant's argument ignores the plain wording of the bond. 
The bond unconditionally obligates defendant to pay any sum that the COUlts 
finally determine to be due plaintiffby the principal, Airpark, up to the amount of 
$23,583.79, plus cOUli costs and interest. That amount has now been detem1ined. 
There is nothing in the contract to limit defendant's obligations to what plaintiff 
might have collected had the lien not been discharged. Defendant guaranteed 
payment of all that its principal owed plaintiff, not what plaintiff might have been 
able to collect. 
At 239 S.B. 2d 605. 
A similar result was reached in Gesco, Inc. v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 414 So.2d 535 
(Fla.App. 1982). There the contractor brought suit to foreclose its lien. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
as the construction lender, obtained a bond that released the lien from the real property. As 
under Idaho Law, the bond operated as a substitution of security pending a judicial determination 
as to the validity of the claim. The posting of the bond did not relieve the lien claimant from 
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provmg all of the conditions precedent to perfection and enforcement of a lien against the 
property. However, proof of priority over the construction mortgage is not such a condition 
precedent. The Court stated: 
The language of the bond clearly established an unconditional obligation for 
payment of the sum that the court determined was due the contractor. The bond 
did not limit the surety's obligation to that which the contractor might have 
collected absent execution of the bond. The trial court, therefore, did not err in 
allowing full recovery on the bond, notwithstanding that foreclosure of the 
mortgage might have extinguished the mechanic's lien had the bond not been 
executed. 
At 414 So. 2d 540 citations deleted. 
The Court in Hatch Companies Contracting, Inc. v. Arizona Bank, 170 Ariz. 553, 826 
P.2d 1179 (1991) reached an identical result holding that when the lien discharge bond has been 
obtained, the lien is shifted fi'om the property to the bond and the claimant is only required to 
prove that it would have been entitled to judgment against the property, not that it could have 
satisfied judgment through foreclosure sale of the property. At 826 P. 2 1184. 
A result consistent with the cases discussed above is George W. Kane, Inc. v. NuScope, 
Inc., 243 Va. 503, 416 S.E.2d 701 (1992). There the owner of real property, Buckingham, 
acquired a construction loan secured by a deed of trust. After the recording of the deed of trust, 
Buckinghanl entered into a construction contract with Kane, its general contractor. Later, 
NuScope, a subcontractor, recorded three liens against the property. Kane obtained bonds 
causing the release of the liens. Thereafter, the subcontractor brought suit against Kane and the 
surety on the bonds seeking enforcement of its claims against the bonds. 
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The Chancellor entered full judgment against the bonds and the issue on appeal was 
whether Buckingham and the construction lender were necessary parties to detelmine the amount 
of the liens that would have been enforceable against the property. On appeal, the Chancellor 
was affirmed, with the Court stating: 
Once Kane posted the bond, NuScope's secUlity for the claim underlying its 
mechanic's lien became the bond and not the real estate. When NuScope filed its 
suit demanding payment on the bond, Kane, NuScope's debtor and principal on the 
bond, acquired "an immediate interest in resisting the demand". Id. The same was 
true of Hartford Accident, the surety on the bond. Both were necessary pariies to 
that suit. 
But once the encumbrance on Buckingham's property was released and replaced 
by a substitute security, the owner no longer had an interest in its propeliy "likely 
either to be defeated or diminished" by NuScope's suit on the bond. While, as in 
Mendenhall and Walt Robbins, the beneficiary and the trustee of the construction 
deed oftrust would have acquired such an immediate interest ifNuScope had sued 
to enforce its mechanic's lien by a judicial sale of the propeliy encumbered by that 
deed of trust, neither had such an interest once the mechanic's lien was released 
and NuScope sued to enforce its claim against the substitute secUlity. 
At 416 S.B. 2d 705. 
The result reached in Kane is that the relative priority between a lien and a deed of trust 
becomes irrelevant when the lien is released by the filing of a bond. 
In a series of decisions issued by Judge Scholl of the Superior COUli of Connecticut on 
April 7, 2009, the issue before the COUli is whether the priority of the lien claimant's lien in 
relation to other encumbrances on the propeliy to which the lien attached, and therefore, the 
existence of any equity to satisfy the lien, is the proper consideration by the Court in determining 
the lien's validity when the lien on the real propeliy has been discharged by the filing of a bond. 
In all of its decisions, the Court found that the issue of priority in relation to other encumbrances 
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has no place in the Court's consideration of whether the lien itself was otherwise valid. In 
Dalene Hardwood Flooring Company, Inc. v. Ashforth Properties Construction, Inc., 2009 WL 
1175516 (Conn. Super. 2009), the COUli explained: 
The issue before the court is whether the pliority of the Plaintiffs mechanic's lien 
in relation to other encumbrances on the property to which the lien attached, and 
therefore, the existence of any equity to satisfy the lien, is a proper consideration 
by the court in detemlining the lien's "validity." 
As a result, the lienor's action on the bond is an action to recover what is owed the 
lienor for its work on the liened propeliy, the payment of which was sought to be 
secured by the lien. In A. Petrucci Construction Co. v. Alaimo Excavators & 
Blasters, Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, 
Docket No. CV90032322S (July 9, 1990, Fuller, J.) (2 Conn. L. Rptr 106), where 
the plaintiff substituted a bond for a mechanic's lien filed by the defendant after 
claiming that it was not fully paid by the plaintiff for work performed, the court 
found that: If[TJhe action is no longer an action involving land or foreclosure of a 
lien on real property. The action is a conventional civil action '" The underlying 
action is now on a bond, which is a contract obligating a third party to respond in 
damages if the principal does not do so. If Similarly, in NY Conn Corporation v. 
Southbury Diagnostic Imaging Center, Superior Court of Connecticut, Docket 
No. 990337528S (April 4, 2000, Moraghan, J.) (27 Conn. L. Rptr. 42), where the 
plaintiff and defendant agreed to substitute a bond for the plaintiffs mechanic's 
lien, the court found that "the [action on the bond] is no longer an action in which 
the plaintiff is seeking foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. The present action is 
essentially contractual because the bond was substituted for the plaintiffs lien." 
As a result, the effect of a bond substituted for a mechanic's lien is to release the 
property from the mechanic's lien while providing the lienor security for payment 
from the parties who undertook the bond agreement. The bond, therefore, is not 
substituted for the land in the sense that equity may proceed against the bond as it 
could against the land, but the bond becomes a contract between the parties that is 
enforceable at common law. 
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs bond is invalid because a constmction 
mortgage on the liened property had priority over the Plaintiffs mechanic's lien, 
and, as a result, there was no equity in the property to which the Plaintiffs 
mechanic's lien attached. The Plaintiff argues that priority is not a basis to contest 
validity pursuant to General Statutes § 49-37(b)(3) because validity is not 
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dependent on priority, but rather upon compliance with the statutory filing 
requirements. The cOUli agrees. 
There is nothing in General Statutes § 49-34 indicating that in order to be "valid" 
a mechanic's lien must attach to sufficient equity in the property to satisfy the 
amount of the lien. 
A mechanic's lien may be valid as a matter of law even if it is "worthless as a 
matter of fact. If 
Only after the bond has been posted do the principal and surety have an 
oppOliunity to test the validity or amount of the liens. Even then, there is no 
authority for reducing the amount of the lien solely based on priority. citations 
deleted in part. 
Likewise, in Ashforth Properties Construction, Inc. v. Bank of Scotland, 2009 WL 
1175538 (Conn. Super. 2009), Judge Scholl again noted that a lien may be valid as a matter of 
law even if it is wOlihless as a matter of fact. Judge Scholl wrote: 
In this case, if the Defendants had not sought to substitute the Plaintiffs 
mechanic's lien with a bond, the priority of that lien in relation to the Defendants' 
mortgage would have had to be determined in the foreclosure action, and, if the 
Plaintiffs lien was found to be junior to the Defendant's mortgage the judgment of 
strict foreclosure would have temlinated the Plaintiffs interest in the property 
unless it was able to redeem. When the debt of a prior mortgage exceeds that of a 
later encumbrance, the latter is worthless because the property contains no equity 
to satisfy the later encumbrance. citations and quotations deleted. 
However, Judge Scholl found that when a bond is posted, the effect is to shift the lien 
from the real property to the bond and that the underlying action is now upon the bond, which is 
a contract obligating a third party to respond to damages if the principal does not do so. As such, 
the issue of the priority of the Plaintiffs lien in relation to other encumbrances on the lien 
property has no place in the Court's consideration on the issue of whether or not the lien was 
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valid, even if, as a practical matter, the lien is worthless. If the lien is valid, the bond becomes a 
contract between the paliies which is enforceable regardless of the value ofthe lien. 
On the same day Judge Scholl reached identical results in Thyssenkrupp Elevator 
COlporation v. Bank of Scotland, 2009 WL 1143143 (Conn.Super. 2009) and Shepard Steel Co., 
Inc. v. Bank of Scotland, 2009 WL 1175527 (Conn.Super. 2009) finding in each case that the 
priority of a lien claimant's lien in relation to other encumbrances on the property had no place in 
detennining whether the lien was valid. Each case further found that there was no authority for 
the Court to reduce the lien on the basis that there was insufficient equity in the property. 
A similar result was reached in Groom v. W.H Ward Lumber Co., Inc., 432 So.2d 984 
(La.App. 1983). In this case, the materialman filed a lien against the subject property. 
Thereafter, the materialman commenced the foreclosure action and was awarded a default 
judgment. After judgment was entered, the property owner bonded around the claim of lien. 
The court enforced the claim of lien against the bond of Union Pacific Insurance Company 
notwithstanding the fact that the property had been conveyed prior to the filing of the lien and 
the materialman would not have been able to foreclose the lien. The cOUli found that the default 
judgment established the legality of the claim and that pursuant to the language of the bond, the 
surety was contractually obligated to pay in the event the legality of the claim was established. 
Undersigned counsel has only been able to locate one decision in which priority was 
relevant when a bond had been filed to discharge a lien, that being York Federal Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. William A. Hazel, Inc., 256 Va. 598, 506 S.B. 2d 315 (1998). The Virginia statutory 
scheme regarding liens and the bonding off of liens is substantially different than the Idaho 
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statute and those jUlisdictions having laws similar to Idaho. Virginia Code § 43-70 states in 
relevant paIi: 
In any suit brought under the provisions of § 43-22, the owner of the building and 
premises to which the lien, or liens, sought to be enforced shall have attached, the 
general contractor for such building or other parties in interest may, after five 
days' notice to the lienor, or lienors, apply to the court in which such suit shall be 
pending, or to the judge thereof in vacation, for pennission to pay into court an 
amount of money sufficient to discharge such lien, or liens, and the costs of the 
suit or for pennission to file a bond in the penalty of double the amount of such 
lien, or liens, and costs, with surety to be approved by the court, or judge, 
conditioned for the payment of such judgment adjudicating the lien or liens 
to be valid and determining the amount for which the same would have been 
enforceable against the real estate as may be rendered by the court upon the 
hearing of the case on its merits, which pennission shall be granted by the court, 
or judge, in either such case, unless good cause be shown against the SaIne by 
some pmiy in interest. emphasis added. 
Virginia Code § 43-21 provides for the priority of mechanic's liens and other 
encumbrances. ,Vhen, as in York, there is a deed of trust given and recorded prior to the 
commencement of any work being perfonned by a mechanic, the prior deed of trust holder has 
priority, but only to the extent of the value of the land as detennined by the Court excluding the 
value of buildings or structures located thereon. Under Virginia law, unlike Idaho law, when a 
bond has been filed the lien claimant must prove two facts: 
1. that the lien was valid; and 
2. the amount which the lien would have been enforceable against the real estate 
after giving the plior deed of trust holder priority as to the extent only of the value 
of the land exclusive of all improvements. 
After the posting ofbond, and the District Court's order releasing the Wadsworth lien for 
all purposes, Wadsworth was only required to prove that its lien had been valid and the amount 
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of the lien. Upon proof of those factors, American Bank and Intemational Fidelity Insurance 
Company are contractually obligated under the bond to pay to WadswOlih the amount the 
District Court adjudged to have been secured by the Wadsworth lien. Nothing in Idaho Code 
§ 45-519, § 45-521, or § 45-522 required WadswOlih to prove its lien priority or the amount of 
money it might have received upon any foreclosure of its lien. American Bank desired to obtain 
the release of the WadswOlih lien by the filing of the bond and obtaining the order for release of 
lien. The trade-off for being able to deal with the property free and clear of the Wadsworth lien 
is that the issue of lien priority is removed. The District Comi was conect in ruling that lien 
priority was no longer relevant as between American Bank's mortgage and the Wadsworth lien. 
2. The Application of the Idaho Contractor Registration Act as Urged by American 
Bank 'Vill Violate Article XIII, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Aliicle XIII, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution states: 
The legislature shall provide by proper legislation for giving to mechanics, 
laborers, and material men an adequate lien on the subject matter of their 
labor. 
While the public policy of the State of Idaho is to be found in its Constitution and 
statutes, a statute cannot declare a public policy contrary to the Constitution. Boise-Payette 
Lumber Co. v. Challis Independent School District No.1, 46 Idaho 403, at 408, 268 P. 26 
(1928); see also, State v.Idaho Power Company, 81 Idaho 487, 346 P.2d 596 (1959) 
In State ex. reI. Black v. State Board of Education, 33 Idaho 415, at 429, 196 P. 201 
(1921), the court stated: 
When a constitutional provision or legislative act is fairly open to two 
constructions, one of which will carry out and the other defeat some great 
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public purpose for which it was designed, the fonner construction should 
be applied. 
An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its 
constitutionality. An1erican Falls Reservoir District No. 2 v. Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, 143 Idaho 862, at 869, 154 P.3d 433 (2007); see also, Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 
147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 963 (2009); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 151 Idaho 882, 265 P.3d 495 
(2011). 
The Idaho Statutes governing mechanic's and laborer's liens are to be liberally construed 
so as to effect their objects and to promote justice. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. 
First Security Bank of Idaho, 94 Idaho 489, at 493, 491, P.2d 1261 (1971). Likewise, in 
Park West Homes, LLCv. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 283 P.3d 203, at 205 (2010), the Court stated 
that "The mechanic's lien statutes are liberally construed in favor of those to whom the lien is 
granted, and to create a valid lien, the claimant must substantially comply with the statutory 
requirement." In BMC West, COlP v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, at 893, 174 P.3d 399 (2007), the 
Court stated: "Materialmen's lien laws are construed liberally in favor of the person who 
performs labor upon or furnishes material to be used in the construction of a building." 
In Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, __ Idaho _, 277 
PJd 374 at 379 (2012), this Court recently inserted a limitation on the public policy ofliberally 
construing lien laws in favor of lien claimants when it stated that: "The solicitude toward 
contractors reflected in Article XIII, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution, and the mechanics' lien laws 
does not extend to unregistered contractors. If In a footnote, the Court however specifically noted 
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that the lien claimant had not asselied that the ICRA was in violation of Article XIII, § 6 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
As an accommodation to BRN, in order to meet the project construction schedule, 
WadswOlih commenced performing some work during October 2006 on the project on the basis 
of the Conditional Letter of Intent. Wadsworth registered under the ICRA on January 9, 2007 
and entered into its construction contractwith BRN on or subsequent to January 27, 2007. 
At the District Court, and before this COUli, American Bank takes the position that if 
WadswOlih perfonned one day, one hour, or presumably even only one minute of work on the 
project while not registered under the ICRA, then Wadsworth is balTed pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 54-5208 and § 54-5217(2) from seeking any recovery for all of its work that it perfonned and 
the materials that were provided to the project while Wadsworth was registered. Likewise, 
American Bank argued, and now argues, that because Wadsworth engaged unregistered 
subcontractors, it would not only be barred from recovering the unpaid amounts owing to such 
subcontractors, but should be barred from all recovery, including all work and materials 
fumished to the project during the time that Wadsworth was registered. 
At the District Court, WadswOlih argued that as it was, at the time 0 f the commencement 
of work, a licensed public works contractor, it was exempt from registration pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 54-5205(1) and that Wadsworth had obtained satisfactory proof to it that its 
subcontractors were, or would be, registered so that no violation of Idaho Code § 54-5204(2) 
occulTed. The District Court rejected WadswOlih's argument that it was exempt from 
registration stating: H[TJhe exemption does not apply because, although this Court finds that 
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Wadsworth did not act with the intent to evade as it was registered under Idaho Code § 54-1901, 
Wadsworth did hold itself out as a registered contractor when it executed the July 17, 2006 
Contractor's Proposal and the September 18, 2006 Conditional Letter of Intent." R, Vol. 13, p. 
322. The District COUli erred in this respect because while Wadsworth did hold itself out as a 
contractor, it did not, and could not, hold itself out as a registered contractor because at that point 
in time, Wadsworth was unaware of the existence of the ICRA. The District COUli fmiher 
rejected Wadsworth's argUlnent that it had received satisfactory proof to itself that its 
subcontractors had registered under the ICRA by finding that an oral representation by a 
subcontractor that it was registered under the ICRA cannot constitute satisfactory proof as a 
matter of law. R, Vol. 13, p. 3229. Wadswolih had argued that the "satisfactory proof' standard 
set forth in Idaho Code § 54-5204(2) is a subjective standard and that if Wadsworth deemed that 
the proof submitted to it is satisfactory, no violation of the statute has occurred and that the 
statute can only be violated if Wadswolih knew that the subcontractor was not registered, or if 
Wadsworth received no proof of any nature that the subcontractor was registered. 
The District Court found that Wadsworth was not entitled to compensation for the work it 
perfoffiled prior to registration, and likewise, was not entitled to the amount owing to its 
unregistered subcontractor but was not barred from bringing or maintaining an action to collect 
for compensation for any work, labor, or material it provided or supplied to the project dUling the 
time it was registered. The District Court quoted ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 
603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), for the principle that "to hold otherwise would be that a contractor 
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who violated the Act would be forever barred from obtaining a mechanic's lien." R, Vol. 13, 
p.3225. 
This ruling is in accordance with Stonebrook Construction, supra, in that it liberally 
construes material men lien laws in favor of contractors when registered but does not extend that 
care and concern for actions taken when the contractor is unregistered. 
The ruling by the District Court applies the ICRA in the manner that is consistent with 
Article XIII, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution in that it provides for an adequate lien for laborers and 
material men. The application of the ICRA as urged by Amelican Bank would not provide a 
laborer or material man with an adequate lien. Under American Bank's application, one minute 
of unregistered work would bar a laborer or material man from seeking compensation for years 
of registered work. Such an application does not provide an adequate lien and is contrary to the 
provisions of Article XIII, § 6, Idaho Constitution. The interpretation and application of the 
ICRA as submitted by Wadsworth upholds its constitutionality and is consistent with the public 
policy ofthe State ofIdaho as found in Article XIII, § 6, Idaho Constitution. 
3. Work Performed by Wadsworth Before Registration under the ICRA, and'Vork 
Performed by an Unregistered Subcontractor, Is Severable and Separate from the 
Work Performed by Wadsworth While Registered, and Such Work Is Not in 
Violation of the IeRA. 
To accommodate BRN's construction schedule, Wadsworth commenced work on the 
project dUling October of 2006 before the contract between Wadsworth and BRN was negotiated 
and executed. WadswOlih commenced the work under a Conditional Letter of Intent. Exhibit B. 
The Conditional Letter of Intent did not obligate BRN to enter into a contract with Wadsworth, 
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but indicated its intention to do so. Had no contract been entered into between Wadsworth and 
BRN, ERN would have been obligated to pay to Wadsworth for its work under either an implied 
in fact contract theory or unjust enrichment. Wadsworth registered under the ICRA on 
January 9,2007 and the final contract with BRN was entered into on or subsequent to 
January 27, 2007. Thus, all the work that Wadsworth performed plior to registration was not 
work performed under the tenns of the final contract. 
Besides having its final contract with BRN, Wadsworth had a separate contract with 
Precision Irrigation, Exhibit C, a subcontractor, whose president confinned to the president of 
Wadsworth that Precision was registered with the State of Idaho to provide the work set forth in 
the contract. Tr. pp. 182-184, P. 231. Mr. Sullivan's representation to Mr. HlliTell was incorrect 
and he apparently confused having Precision registered as a foreign corporation qualified to do 
business in Idaho with the Idaho Secretary of State with registration under the ICRA. Tr. p. 205. 
It is the separate contract between Wadswolih and Precision Irrigation that runs afoul of Idaho 
Code § 54-5204(2) and not the Wadsworth-BRN contract which fonns the basis of the 
Wadsworth claims. 
The concept of severability was utilized by this Court in Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 
604, 200 P.3d 1153 (2009) in which the Court was faced with a situation where an architect 
performed services while unlicensed but later perfonned services while licensed. The COUli 
found that the licensed work is deemed to be chronologically separate from the unlicensed work. 
The Court stated: 
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Although Farrell's work perfomled while unlicense was illegal, his action after 
receiving his licensed were celiainly legal. Wbere a transaction is composed of 
both benign and offensive components and the different portions are severable, 
the unobjectionable parts are generally enforceable. At 146 Idaho 611. 
The Farrell approach was utilized and cited with approval by this COUli in Park West 
HOlnes, LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603,2038 P.3d 203(2010), in which this COUli wrote; 
Thus, the contractor is denied a lien for work or labor done or materials furnished 
in the construction during the period that the contractor is not registered. 
Although work done by ParkWest while unregistered was illegal, work done after 
it registered was celiainly legal. 
Thus, ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided and materials 
it supplied during the time that it was duly registered. To hold otllerwise 
would mean that a contractor who violated the Act would be forever barred 
from obtaining a mechanic's lien. At 149 Idaho 608. (Emphasis added). 
This approach was utilized by the District COUli in MWSH Idaho Falls, LLC v. Lupton, 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-09-224 (attached as Addendmn A) in which the District Court 
was faced with a situation in which a contractor performed work on a project first while it was 
unregistered under the ICRA and during latter stages while registered. The Comi found that 
while the contractor clearly may not seek to recover for work perfonned while not registered, the 
work performed while registered was severable and that the contractor should not be penalized 
for services he performed while in compliance with the law. The Court found that the work 
perfomled after registration was not unlawful or illegal and should not preclude recovery. 
Wadsworth submits that all work that it performed subsequent to January 9, 2007 was 
lawful and legal and severable from the work that Wadsworth perfonned under the Conditional 
Letter of Intent prior to January 9, 2007 and from the separate Wadswolih-Precision Irrigation 
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Contract. Wadsworth submits that it thus should not be precluded from recovery for its post 
January 9, 2007 work. This result is consistent with the policy of the State ofIdaho as found in 
Article XIII, § 6, Idaho Constitution. 
4. The District Court's Award to Wadsworth of Prejudgment Interest, Attorney Fees, 
and Costs Should Be Affirmed. 
The District Court awarded to Wadsworth its attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-
513 and § 45-522. Idaho Code § 45-513 provides that when a person "claims a lien against a 
property ... the court shall also allow as part of the costs the monies paid for filing and recording 
the claim, and reasonable attorney's fees." In relevant part, Idaho Code § 45-522 provides: 
(1) The lien claimant is entitled to bring an action against the lien 
claimant's debtor and to join therein the surety on the bond. The 
rights of the lien claimant include and the court may award to him in 
that acti on: 
(a) The account found due to the lien claimant by the court; 
(b) The cost of preparing and filing the lien claim, including 
attorney's fees, if any; 
(c) The costs of the proceedings; 
(d) Attorney's fees for representation of the lien claimant in the 
proceedings; and 
(e) Interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum on the 
amount found due to the lien claimant and from the date 
found by the court that the sum was due and payable. 
The Court found that the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded is a discretionary 
function of the COUli and that the Court is free to consider all factors it deems as having a 
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bearing on the case and in its detennination of the amount of reasonable attomey fees, citing 
Electrical Sales Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814,41 P.3d 242 (2002). R, Vol. 13, p. 3341. 
The Court found that while Wadsworth did prevail on its claim of lien, Wadswolih only 
received a judgment in the amount of 79.2% of the claimed amount. In the exercise of 
discretion, the Court then proportionally reduced the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought 
by Wadsworth by 21.8%, citing Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P.3d 367 (2004). R, Vol. 
13, p. 3342. 
The District Court was clearly con-ect in awarding Wadsworth its attorney's fees and 
costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-513 and § 45-522 and was acting within its discretion when it 
detelmined the amount of attorney's fees and costs awarded to Wadsworth. 
The District Court con-ectIy recognized that an award of prejudgment interest is 
discretionary, and in the exercise of that discretion, awarded Wadsworth prejudgment interest in 
the amount of7% per annum pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-522. R, Vol. 13, p. 3344. 
5. The District Court Erred in Finding That 'Vadsworth Waived its Lien Rights for 
Retainage. 
Wadsworth respectively submits that the District Court committed en-or when it ruled 
that Wadsworth had waived its right to lien for unpaid retainage when it executed the BRN 
prepared lien rule release fonns, waiving not only the $257,043.00 in unpaid retainage owing as 
of the date of the last BRN lien release fonn, but also an additional $86,942.00 in unpaid 
retainage owing after the date of the last BRN prepared lien release fonn, for a total 
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of$343,985.00. The District Court thus committed error when it reduced the amount of the 
Wadsworth lien by the sum of$343,985.00. 
The final contract between Wadsworth and BRN provided that as a prerequisite for any 
payment Wadswmih would submit to BRN, in a form satisfactory to it, lien releases. Exhibit D, 
p. 4. While the contract had attached to it a copy of a BRN lien release form, the contract did not 
require the use of that pmiicular form. 
Wadswmih was familiar with its conditional waiver and release on progress payment 
fonn which it used in the ordinary course of business. The form was prepared pursuant to 
Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1008 and that conditioned upon bank clearance of a check in the 
sum of the application, Wadsworth was acknowledging payment in full for work perfonned to 
the date set fmih in the fonn, excluding retention, pending modifications, and changes or items 
furnished after the date set forth. This fonn did not affect the right to lien for unpaid retainage 
and did not affect lien priority in the event that a lien is recorded subsequent to the date of the 
document. 
Under the contract, Wadsworth was to be paid ninety-five percent (95%) of its progress 
payment application. Five percent (5%) of the payment application would be held as retainage, 
payable upon completion of the project. It makes no sense for Wadsworth, upon receipt of 
ninety-five percent (95%) of its payment application, to waive its light to file a lien for the 
remaining five percent (5%) in the event that it was not paid. 
Wadsworth made a total of twenty-five applications for payment to BRN. WadswOlih 
prepared lien release forms were used on sixteen of those applications and were accepted by 
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BRN. On the six occasions when the BRN prepared lien release form was used, it was either 
because there was a mistake in completing the Wadsworth form, or Wadsworth neglected to 
enclose a lien release form with a payment application, or the amount of money that BRN 
proposed to pay toward an application was different than the amount of the application itself 
Each time Mr. Harrell executed a BRN prepared conditional lien waiver fOlID, it was with the 
understanding that the only difference between it and the Wadsworth prepared form was in the 
amount set forth in the form. At no time when Mr. Harrell executed a BRN prepared lien release 
fonn was there ever an intention by Mr. Harrell to waive lien rights for unpaid retainage. 
A. Lack of Consideration. 
The general rule is that an express waiver of a mechanic's lien must be supported by 
consideration in order to be effective and binding. Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38,539 P.2d 590 
(1975). The doing of something which one is already bound by contract to do is not a valid 
consideration. In Louk v. Patten, 58 Idaho 334, 73 P.2d 949 (1937), this Court stated: 
A promise to do what the promisor is already bound to do cannot be consideration, 
for if a person gets nothing in return for his promise but that to which he is 
already legally entitled, the consideration is unreal. Therefore, as a general rule, 
the performance of, or the promise to perform, an existing legal obligation is not a 
valid consideration. 
The promise of a person to carry out a subsisting contract with the promise or the 
performance of such contractual duty is clearly no consideration, as he is doing no 
more than he was already obligated to do, and hence has sustained no detriment, 
nor has the other pmiy to the contract obtained any benefit. 
At 73 P .2d 951, citations deleted. 
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The issue before the Court in Sussel Co. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
St. Paul, 304 Minn. 433,232 NW.2d 88 (1975) was whether a lien waiver given in connection 
with an obligated contractual payment constituted merely a waiver of past lien rights or included 
a waiver of future lien rights and lien priorities. The Court found that there was no consideration 
for anything other than a waiver of past lien rights. The COUli stated: 
However, it is clear that respondent agreed on June 27 to pay appellant in 
exchange for appellant's waiver of past lien rights. Thus, appellant's purported 
waiver of priorities and future lien rights on July 13 was devoid of consideration, 
as respondent was merely doing that which it was already obligated to do. 
Appellant received respondent's promise to pay in exchange for its waiver of past 
lien rights. The waiver of priorities and future lien rights required additional 
consideration, totally lacking in this case. 
As a result, we hold that the check issued by respondent was not voluntary, but 
was made pursuant to an existing legal commitment. The lien waiver printed on 
the reverse side of the check, then, was void of the additional consideration 
necessary to waive future lien rights from and after June 27, 1972, and was 
unenforceable. 
At 232 N.W. 2d 91, citations deleted. 
A similar issue was before the Court in Beebe Construction Corp. v. Circle R Co., 10 
Ohio App.2d 127,226 N.E.2d 573 (1967) where the Comi found that there was no consideration 
for a waiver of a mechanic's lien beyond the amount of the payment given for the lien waiver. 
The Court stated: 
In paying to plaintiff $1,196.73, upon receipt ofa waiver of mechanic's lien from 
the plaintiff, defendant Putnam, so far as appears fi:ol11 the record in this case, was 
doing only what it was legally bound to do. A waiver of mechanic's lien in 
consideration of payments made by an owner or contractor, which he is legally 
bound to pay to the claimant, does not constitute valuable consideration so as to 
make the lien waiver effective and binding. 
37 
At 226 N.E. 2d 576, citations deleted. 
BRN never paid to Wadsworth anything in addition to that which was owed under the 
contract. On occasions, BRN paid substantially less. BRN did not pay the November 30, 2007 
Application nor the Applications dated December 31,2007, January 31,2008, and February 28, 
2008 until they paid all four Applications with one check during April of 2008. As all of these 
paY111ents were in amounts different than the Wadsworth applications and corresponding 
Wadsworth Conditional Lien Waiver F01111S, BRN prepared its Lien Waiver Foml so that it 
would have a fonn that conesponded to the amount of each check. No consideration was given 
for any waiver of Wadsworth's lien rights for unpaid retainage. Wadsworth was only waiving, 
and consideration was only given, for Wadsworth's acknowledgment that it had received the 
amount of the payment and waived any right to file a lien based upon the amount of the payment. 
American Bank may argue that Wadsworth stipulated to having received full 
consideration for each of the six BRN prepared lien releases. What Wadsworth stipulated to was 
that for each of those six BRN prepared lien releases, BRN paid to Wadsworth the dollar sum 
that is referenced in each. R, Vol. 12. p. 3009. Wadsworth was only acknowledging that it had 
received the amount of the payment set forth in the release and that it was waiving any right to 
file a lien based upon the amount of that payment. Wadsworth was not acknowledging that it 
had received any consideration for subordinating its lien priority or waiving its right to lien for 
unpaid retain age. On the basis of the foregoing, the lack of consideration makes any waiver of 
lien rights for unpaid retainage ineffective. 
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B. Waiver. 
American Bank argues that by mistakenly executing six BRN prepared lien release 
f01111S, Wadsworth has waived its lien rights for unpaid retainage. Waiver is a voluntary, 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Frontier Federal Savings and Loan Association v. 
Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 853 P.2d 553 (1993). As stated by this Court in Seaport Citizens 
Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 735 P.d 1047 (Ct. App. 1987), "Waiver is foremost a question of 
intent. To establish a waiver, the intention to waive must clearly appear." At 112 Idaho 739. 
Clearly, on the basis of the forgoing, Wadswolih did not knowingly or intentionally waive its 
lien rights for unpaid retainage. 
6. Even Assuming, Arguendo, Wadsworth Waived the $257,043.00 in Unpaid 
Retainage Owing Up to the Date of the Last BRN Prepare Lien Release Form, the 
District Court Erred in Ruling that Wadsworth Waived Lien Rights for Retainage 
Subsequent to That Date in the Additional Sum of $86,942.00. 
The District COUli found that while the Wadsworth twentieth payment application was 
accompanied with a Wadsworth prepared lien release form and was paid in full, that Wadsworth 
was contractually obligated to subinit to BRN a BRN prepared lien release fonn and that as such 
Wadsworth was deemed to have waived its right to file a lien for unpaid retainage up to the date 
of that application. R, Vol. 13, p. 3241. In this, the District Court committed error. 
A finding of the District Court will be set aside if there is no substantial competent 
evidence to support it. MBNA America Bank, NA. v. Fouche, 146 Idaho 1, 189 P.3d 463 (2008). 
Here, the only evidence before the court was the contract between WadswOlih and BRN which 
merely provided that with each payment application, Wadsworth would submit to BRN a lien 
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release fom1 in a fom1 satisfactory to BRN. Of the twenty-five payment applications, sixteen of 
them were accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared lien release fonn and were acceptable to 
BRN. 
Without the benefit of a trial transcript, the District Court, in its Memorandum Decision 
Following Court Trial, wrote that Mr. Capps testified that Wadsworth was contractually 
obligated to execute and deliver a BRN prepared lien release fonn with a payment application. 
R, Vol. 13, p. 3239. Mr. Capps did not so testify, but instead, testified only that BRN expected 
Wadsworth to utilize the BRN fonn. Tr., pp. 352, 356. 
The WadswOlih-BRN contract is clear and unambiguous and Mr. Capp's testimony as to 
his understanding of the lien release fonns expected or required to be used is irrelevant and 
inadmissible to vary the clear language of the contract. Idaho First National Bank v. David 
Steed and Associates, Inc., 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 279 (1992). The contract only required a 
lien release fonn acceptable to BRN and clearly the WadswOlih lien release fonn was acceptable 
toBRN. 
7. The Amount of Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Interest Awarded by the District Court 
in Favor of Wadsworth Should Be Increased Proportionately by the Amount That 
this Court Finds Wadsworth Had Not Waived Lien Rights for Retainage. 
As attorney's fees, costs, and interest were awarded by the District Court on the 
percentage basis of \Vadsworth's recovery as compared to the an10unt of its claim, those awards 
should be proportionately increased by the amount, if any, that this Court finds that Wadsworth 
had not waived its lien rights for unpaid retain age. This result would be consistent with the 
methodology used by the District Court in detennining those amounts. 
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The WadswOlih claim was $2,329,439.72. The District Court awarded Wadsworth 
$1,845,697.78 in principal. If this Court were to increase that award by $343,985.00 to 
$2,189,682.78, then Wadsworth would have recovered 94% of its claim. WadswOlih sought 
$266,518.50 in attorney's fees and $3,524.68 in costs, for a total of $270,043.18. On the basis 
that Wadsworth only recovered 79.2% of the amount of its claim, the District Court awarded 
Wadsworth 79.2% of its claimed attorney's fees and costs. This Court should properly award 
Wadsworth 94% of its attorney's fees and costs, being the sum of$253,840.59, which would be 
an increase of$45,423.12 to the $208,417.47 previously awarded. R, Vol. 13, p. 3343. 
Wadsworth Payment Application No. 25 RET dated November 30, 2008 was the 
Wadsworth Payment Application for unpaid retainage. Exhibit 28. It was due and payable on 
December 25, 2008. Interest on $343,985.00 to January 25, 2009 is $2,045.07 and total interest 
calculated on this sum to October 6, 2011, being the date of judgment, is $66,959.55. 
Wadsworth thus submits that it should receive judgment in the principal sum of $2,189,682.78, 
pre-judgment interest in the sum of $438,328.37, and attorney's fees and costs in the sum of 
$253,840.59. 
Repeating this exercise by only allowing Wadsworth to recover post March 19, 2008 
unpaid retain age would result in a principal judgment of $1,932,639.78, pre-judgment interest in 
the sum of $388,288.87, and attorney's fees and costs in the sum of$224, 135.84. 
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8. Wadsworth Is Entitled to an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
The District Court was clearly correct in awarding Wadsworth its attorney's fees and 
costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-513 and § 45-522. In the event that Wadsworth prevails on 
this appeal, it respectively submits that under those statutory previsions and under LR.C.P. 
54( c)(1) that an award to it of attorney's fees and costs on appeal is appropliate under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Wadsworth respectfully submits that the District Court was correct in ruling that the 
relative lien priority between the Amelican Bank mortgage and the WadswOlih claim of lien was 
no longer relevant subsequent to the filing of the bond by American Bank and the order of the 
District Court releasing the lien for all purposes. WadswOlih also submits that the District Court 
was correct in ruling that the work and materials furnished by Wadsworth to the project after its 
registration under the ICRA was lawful and subject to recovery notwithstanding pre-contract pre-
registration work by Wadsworth or the use of an unregistered subcontractor under a separate 
contract. Likewise, Wadsworth submits that the District Court's award to Wadsworth of 
prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and costs is correct subject to adjustment on the basis that 
this Court awards to Wadsworth additional sums of unpaid retainage. 
Wadsworth does assert that the District Court committed error in finding that Wadsworth 
waived its right to lien for unpaid retainage in the sum of $343,985.00 and in reducing the 
Wadsworth claim in that amount. This COUli should either increase the judgment awarded to 
Wadsworth in the sum of $343,985.00, or alternatively increase the judgment by the amount of 
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retainage accruing subsequent to the effective date of the last BRN prepared lien release form in 
the sum of $86,942.00. As attorney's fees, costs, and interest were awarded to Wadsworth by the 
Distlict Court on the percentage basis of Wadsworth's recovery as compared to the amount of its 
claim, those awards should likewise be adjusted on a proportionate basis in the event this Court 
will award to Wadsworth the right to recover additional retain age, in the manner set forth above. 
Lastly, Wadsworth respectfully submits that it is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees 
and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of Au 
~<8~~2:::.,L~~t==========----.... E~dwar . Anson, fSB No. 2074 
W ERSPOON KELLEY 
Te Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814-2146 
Attorneys for Wadsworth Golf Construction 
Company of the Southwest 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of August, 2012, I caused two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
C. Clayton Gill 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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Addendum A to Respondent's Brief 
MWSH Idaho Falls, LLC, 
v. 
Lela M. Lupton d/b/a JAL Contracting 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
MWSH's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-09-224 
, ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MWSH Idaho Falls, LLC, an Oregon Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Lela M. Lupton d/b/a JAL Contracting, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-09-224 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court declaring Defendant's lien invalid and 
dismissing the portion of Defendant's counterclaim seeking to foreclose a lien. The 
Court previously heard oral argument on the motion and then took the matter under 
advisement. 
I. FACTS 
Plaintiff owns property in Bonneville County on which it constructed an assisted 
living, retirement and memory care community (the Project). Defendant performed sub-
contract work on the Project under the general contractor, Mountain West Communjty 
Construction (MWCC). Plaintiff and MWCC are both Oregon limited liability 
companies. At the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court took 
judicial notice of certain Idaho Secretary of State records that show Plaintiff and MWCC 
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have the same address, registered agent, and manager. Idaho Rule of Evidence 201; 
Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 775 P.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Defendant began working on the Project no later than April 2008, but did not 
register under th~ Idaho Contractor Registration Act (the Act) until September 19, 2008. 1 
Defendant contends that it informed MWCC via email about its lack of registration 
before contracting in October 2007 to work on the Project. 2 In response, MWCC 
allegedly told Defendant that it could either work under MWCC's registration or work 
under the registration of another contractor. 
Defendant contracted with JBC Construction Company (JBC), an Idaho 
contractor, to form a limited partnership whereby Defendant would supposedly use JBC's 
Idaho contractor registration. Defendant then requested that MWCC issue the contract 
jointly to the partnership it formed with JBC and "a separate contract labor agreement to 
[Defendant] as a work order from [MWCC]." Affidavit of Lance Lupton, Exhibit E. 
Purpoliedly, Defendant continued to express concern about not being registered as an 
Idaho contractor but was repeatedly reassured by MWCC that everything was all right. 
Based on MWCC's alleged representations, Defendant began working on the Project 
without first registering as a contractor under the Act. 
Defendant continued to work on the Project without incident until August 2008. 
At that time, Defendant became concerned that it wasn't being paid for all of the work 
that had been performed. Therefore, on August 12, 2008, Defendant allegedly emailed 
I Defendant's counterclaim alleges that it began to furnish construction materials, services, and labor "on or 
about April 2008." However, in a letter dated October 24,2008, Defendant references MWCC's alleged 
failure to pay for work "since the February 25, 2008 billing cycle." Affidavit of Lupton, Ex. K. Plaintiff 
suggests that Defendant may have commenced work as early as October 2007. Memorandwn in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Swrunary Judgment at 3. 
2 Plaintiff disputes the authenticity of the emails attached to the Affidavit of Lance Lupton and claims that 
the contents of at least some of the messages are fabricated. 
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MWCC a demand to be paid in full. Affidavit of Lupton, Ex. F. Defendant contends that 
it received an unintended email communication attached to MWCC's response. The 
unintended email was purportedly sent from Kelley Hamilton, manager for both MWCC 
and Plaintiff, to Rod Huschka, MWCC's director of construction. The alleged email 
stated that: 
[Defendant] isn't licensed in Idaho anyway so dismiss them. Better yet, 
work this sub until their money runs out. Since December we've known 
they have no recourse. 
Affidavit of Lupton, Ex. F. Despite allegedly receiving this alarming email, Defendant 
continued to work on the Project due to purported additional reassurances by MWCC to 
pay for the work already performed. 
Defendant eventually ceased working on the Project on October 24, 2008 amidst 
breach of contract allegations levied by both Parties. On December 11, 2008 Defendant 
recorded a lien against the Project in the amount of $1,916,422.55. Plaintiff initiated the 
present action seeking to remove Defendant's lien from the Project and to recover 
damages resulting therefrom. Defendant's counterclaim included a claim for lien 
foreclosure. 
II. STANDARD 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P.56(c). When 
considering a motion for summary judgment, any disputed facts are construed in favor of 
the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are 
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 
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695, 697 (2007). If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary 
judgment is inappropriate. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,394,64 PJd 317, 320 
(2003). 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d 
508, 513 (2009). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 
225,228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, 
the nonmoving party must show that there is a triable issue. G & M Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,524,808 P.2d 851,861 (1991). "[A] complete failure of 
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders 
all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 
39,42,28 P.3d 380, 383 (2001), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The non-moving party's case must be anchored in something 
more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine 
Issue. Corbridge v. ClarkEquip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87,730 P.2d 960,963 (1994). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Right to lien foreclosure under the Act. 
Plaintiffs motion is directed towards the relatively narrow issue of whether the 
Defendant may lien and then seek to foreclose a lien against the subject property. While 
Defendant's response to the motion addresses additional theories ofrecovery such as 
unjust enrichment, those alternative theories of recovery are not placed in issue by 
Plaintiff's motion. 
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Plaintiff argues that Defendant's lien is precluded by the Idaho Contractor 
Registration Act and should be removed from the property. Since this involves a 
relatively new enactment, this is a case of first impression. 1l1ere is no r daho case law 
specifically addressing the issues raised as to the application ofthe Act. 
Idaho Code § 54-5204 provides that it is unlawful for a person to engage in the 
business of a contractor without being registered. As such, contracts with an unregistered 
contractor would be illegal precluding the unregistered contractor from enforcing the 
contract. 
Idaho has long disallowed judicial aid to either party to an illegal 
contract. McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 547, 277 P. 554,559 (1929) 
("No principle in law ... is better settled than that which, with certain 
exceptions, refuses redress to either party to an illegal contract."). An 
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any 
act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. Quiring v. 
Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,566,944 P.2d 695,701 (1997). Generally, when 
the consideration for a contract explicitly violates a statute, the contract is 
illegal and unenforceable. Barry v. Pac. W Canstr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 
832, 103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004). In most cases, the court will leave the 
parties to an illegal contract as it finds them. Jd. 
Farrell v. FYhiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 609, 200 P.3d 1153, 1158 (2009). 
I.C. § 54-5208 precludes the filing of a lien by a contractor who is not registered 
pursuant to the Act. That statute provides as follows: 
A contractor who is not registered as set forth in this chapter, unless 
otherwise exempt, shall be denied and shall be deemed to have 
conclusively waived any right to place a lien upon real property as 
provided for in chapter 5, title 45, Idaho Code. This section shall not 
operate as a denial of lien rights for any subcontractor or independent 
contractor who is duJy registered in accordance with this chapter .and who 
is perfonning services at the direction of another contractor, nor shall it 
operate as a denial of lien rights for any employee of any contractor who is 
not duly registered, or for any supplier of materials to such unregistered 
contractor, so long as such subcontractor, independent contractor, 
employee or supplier did not have actual knowledge that such contractor 
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was not duly registered, or who reasonably believed that such contractor 
was duly registered. 
This section does not preclude Defendant from filing a lien in this matter because 
the facts establish that at the time the lien was filed, Defendant was duly registered. 
However, Idaho Code § 54-5217(2) governs when actions may be brought to 
foreclose a lien. That section provides the following: 
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a 
contractor, unless otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in 
any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the 
performance of any act or contract for which registration is required by 
this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly registered 
contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as provided for in this chapter, 
at all times during the performance of such act or contract. [emphasis 
added] 
Plaintiff argues that under this section Defendant is precluded from bringing any 
action to foreclose on its lien. Vlhile the evidence establishes that Defendant was 
registered during the latter part of the work performed on the project, Plaintiff argues that 
the language in the statute "at all times during the performance of such act or contract" 
precludes an action to foreclose the lien even though Defendant was registered for some 
portion of the contract. 
The principles of statutory interpretation are well established. 
This Court "interprets statutes according to the plain, express 
meaning of the provision in question, and will resort to judicial 
construction only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or 
arguably in conflict with other laws." ld A construction that leads to an 
absurd or ul1Ieasonably harsh result is disfavored. ld at 690, 85 P.3d at 
666. The goal "is to give effect to the purpose of the statute and the 
legislative intent in enacting it, which may be implied from the language 
used or inferred on grounds of policy or reasonableness." The Senator, 
Inc., v. Ada County, Bd. of Equalization, 138 Idaho 566,570,67 P.3d 45, 
49 (2003). 
State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178,184,191 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Idaho,2008). 
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The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent 
of the legislative body that adopted it. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n, 
132 Idaho at 557, 976 P.2d at 483. Such analysis begins with the literal 
language of the enactment. Id. Where the language is unambiguous, the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and 
there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. 
Id . ... However, ambiguity is not present merely because the parties 
present differing interpretations to the court. Id. Constructions that would 
lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. ld. "Language 
of a particular section need not be viewed in a vacmun. And all sections of 
applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine the 
legislature'S intent." Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 197,46 P.3d 
at 14. 
NeighborsforaHealthyGoldForkv. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 131, 176P.3d 126, 
136 (2007). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we 
exercise free review. Zener v. Velde, 135 Idaho 352, 355, 17 P.3d 296, 299 
(CLApp.2000). We will construe a statute as a whole, and the plain 
meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent 
is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. George W 
Watkins Family v. Jviessenger, 118 Idaho 537,539-40, 797 P .2d 1385, 
1387-88 (1990); Zener, 135 Idaho at 355, 17 P.3d at 299. Statutes that are 
in pari materia, i.e., relating to the same subject, must be construed 
together to give effect to legislative intent. Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 
Idaho 547,549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Ed 
of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808, 811,654 P.2d 901,904 (1982). In 
construing a statute, this Court examines the language used, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the 
statutes. Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 525, 148 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2006). 
This Court will avoid an interpretation that would lead to an absurd result 
or render a statute a nullity. State v. Schmitt, 144 Idaho 768, 770, 171 P.3d 
259,261 (Ct.App.2007); State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727, 730,132 P.3d 
1255, 1258 (Ct.App.2006). 
Johnson v. JvJcPhee, 210 P.3d 563, 569 (Idaho App.,2009) 
In this case, the statutory language clearly provides that Defendant may not seek 
to foreclose a lien on the property based upon work performed while not registered under 
the Act. Such a foreclosure action is precluded by the statute. The more difficult issue is 
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whether Defendant, under the circumstances of this case, is entitled to foreclose on a lien 
for work performed after it became registered. 
Again, Plaintiff argues for a statutory interpretation to the effect that if a 
contractor is W1fegistered at anytime during a given project, that contractor is not entitled 
to any recovery for work performed, even work perfom1ed after registration. The Court 
finds a number of problems with such an interpretation and further finds the clause "at all 
times during the performance of such act or contract" in § 54-5217(2) to be ambiguous. 
As set out above, statutes should be interpreted to prevent harsh or absurd results. 
Under Plaintiff's argument, a contractor who fully performed on a contract would not be 
entitled to recover if for example, its registration was not completed until after the first 
day of construction. Under this interpretation, non-registration for one hour or even one 
minute of perfonnance would entirely preclude recovery under a lien. The Court finds 
such an interpretation and result unreasonable. 
Additionally, the penalty provision of § 54-5217 must be construed hannoniously 
with § 54-5204 regarding illegal contracts, and § 54-5208 which allows the filing of a lien 
as tong as the contractor is registered. In cases such as this, the perfonnance or contract 
may be divided into to pre-registration performance/contract and post-registration 
performance/contract. Under § 54-5204, post-registration performance/contract is not 
illegal. 
Guidance on this issue may be gleaned from the decision in Farrell v. Whiteman, 
supra. In that case, an architect sued a developer seeking to recover for architectural 
services provided on a project. The developer defended on the grounds that the architect 
was not licensed at all times with the state ofIdaho and he was therefore precluded from 
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recovering on an "illegal" contract, citing Idaho Code § 54-310 which made it tmlawful 
for a person to practice architecture without a license. The evidence established that the 
architect obtained his Idaho license towards the end of his work on the project. 
In addressing the claim, a unanimous Idaho Supreme Court held that the architect 
could pursue a claim for work performed after being licensed: 
Although Farrell's work performed while lilllicensed was illegal, his 
actions after receiving his license were certainly legal. "Where a 
transaction is composed of both benign and offensive components and the 
different portions are severable, the unobjectionable parts are generally 
enforceable." Nelson v. Armstrong, 99 Idaho 422, 426, 582 P .2d 1100, 
1104 (1978). In other words, the implied-in-fact contract in this case is 
chronologically separable ..... Where the services are severable, a person 
should not be penalized for the services he performed in compliance with 
the law. 
146 Idaho at 611. 
Accordingly, work perfonned after registration was not unlawful or illegal and 
should not preclude recovery. 
Additionally, as previously indicated § 54-5208 does not preclude the filing of a 
lien as long as the contractor is registered. If lillder Plaintiff s argument a registered 
contractor is precluding from foreclosing on a lien because the contractor performed 
some work while unregistered, the filing of a lien as allowed by §54-5208 would be 
meaningless and § 54-5208 would be superfluous. For purposes of construing the statutes 
harmoniously, the Court finds that under the statutes, a contractor who is registered may 
file a lien, and then foreclose on the lien for work performed while registered. 
Finally, it is important to consider the purpose of the statutory scheme. As set out 
in I.C. § 54-5202, the purpose of the statute is to "provide a mechanism to remove from 
practice incompetent, dishonest, or unprincipled practitioners of construction." The 
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pending motion is not based upon allegations of incompetency or dishonesty. No purpose 
or policy is served by precluding recovery by a registered contractor for work performed 
while registered. Preventing foreclosure of a lien for work performed while registered 
would instead be unreasonably punitive. 
B. Substantial Compliance 
Defendant argues that under the theory of substantial compliance, it still should 
be entitled to lien and foreclose a lien for all work performed on the project. While there 
is nothjng in the Act's plain language that allows for "substantial compliance", Defendant 
contends that the legislative purpose of the Act may nevertheless be satisfied through 
substantial compliance. 
The Idaho Legislature has made clear that all statutes "are to be liberally 
construed, wjth a view to effect their objects and to promote justice." Idaho Code § 73-
102; George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). 
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has yet to directly address whether the requirements 
of the Act may be satisfied through substantial compliance, it has applied the doctrine of 
substantial compliance to other statutes involving a contractor's right to lien. Pierson v. 
Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 539 P.2d 590 (1975); BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 
174 P.3d 399 (2007). In Pierson, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Mechanic's and other related liens are creatures of statute, and 
statutory requirements must be substantially complied with in order to 
perfect a valid lien. Yet, these lien statutes are to be liberally construed: 
"The provisions of our mechanics' and laborers' lien law, as well as all 
other lien statutes, must be liberally construed with a view to effect their 
objects and promote justice." The purpose of these statutes is to 
compensate persons who perform labor upon or furnish material to be 
used in the construction, alteration or repair of a building or structure. 
Pierson, 97 Idaho at 41 (internal citations omitted). 
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Given that a lien may be perfected by substantial compliance with the relevant 
code provisions, it follows that substantial compliance with the Act should likewise be 
sufficient to enforce a lien. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that several 
states with similar contractor registration statutes have adopted rules of substantial 
compliance. Gross v. Bayshore Land Co. 710 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1985) ("The statutory 
bar precluding legal actions ... may be avoided by the contractor's substantial 
compliance with the registration requirements."); Aesthetic Property Maintenance, Inc. v. 
Capitallndem. Corp., 900 P.2d 1210 (Ariz. 1995) ("We thus conclude that substantial 
compliance can be adequate under § 32-1153."); Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 411 
P.2d 564 (Cal. 1966) (adopting a rule of substantial compliance where "such compliance 
has afforded to the obligor the protection contemplated by the statute"); Nevada Equities, 
Inc. v. Willard Pease Drilling Co., 440 P.2d 122 (Nev. 1968) (holding that forfeiture was 
not justified where claimant "substantially complied with the licensing scheme"); 
Koehler v. Donnelly, 838 P.2d 980 (N.M. 1992) ("The doctrine of substantial compliance 
was adopted because we do not insist on literal compliance in a situation where the party 
seeking to escape his obligation has received the full protection contemplated by the 
statute."); Arctic Stone, Ltd. v. Dadvar, 112 P.2d 582 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) ("A 
contractor who fails to register is not barred from bringing an action if the contractor can 
prove substantial compliance[.]"). 
Thus, the Court concludes that substantial compliance may under appropriate 
circumstances satisfy the req uirements of the Act. The issue then becomes whether 
Defendant has raised at least a question of material fact as to Defendant having 
substantially complied with the Act. 
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In jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine of substantial compliance, the 
underlying theme is that substantial compliance is adequate only when it satisfies the 
general policy or purpose of the statute. See Aesthetic Property Maintenance, Inc. v. 
Capital Inden1. Corp., 900 P.2d 1210 (Ariz. 1995). Among the most popular tests for 
determining substantial compliance is that set forth in Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
411 P.2d 564 (CaL 1966). The elements of that test are: "(1) the contractor held a valid 
license at the time of contracting; (2) the contractor readily secured a renewal of that 
license; and (3) the responsibility and competence of the contractor's managing officer 
was officially confirmed throughout the period of performance." Id. at 568. At least one 
state has held that "a crucial element of substantial compliance is that the contractor hold 
a valid license at the time the contract is entered into." Koehler v. Donnelly, 838 P.2d 
980, 982 (1992). Other states focus on "the length of time during which the contractor 
did not hold a valid certificate of registration," Washington Revised Code § 18.27.080, 
and whether or not the unlicensed contractor "knowingly ignore[d] the registration 
requirements." Aesthetic Property Maintenance, Inc., 900 P.2d at 1214 (holding that 
knowingly ignoring the registration requirements is "fatal to a claim of substantial 
compliance. "). 
In the case at bar, Defendant was not registered under the Act at the time of 
contracting nor was it registered during the vast majority of time it performed work on 
the Project. Additionally, Defendant was clearly aware of the registration requirements 
from the outset and yet decided to attempt to work under another contractor's 
registration, which is not allowed under the Act. Nothing Defendant did prior to 
registering in September 2008 satisfied the general policy or purpose of the Act. On the 
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contrary, Defendant's actions indicate an intent to evade the Act's registration 
requirements. Therefore, based on the record before the Court, The Court finds that the 
evidence does not support a theory of substantial compliance whereby Defendant would 
be allowed to foreclose a lien for work performed while umegistered. 
C. Estoppel. 
In arguing that Defendant should be allowed to proceed with a foreclosure of lien 
for all work perfonned on the project, Defendant also raises the theory of estoppel. 
Particularly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should be estopped from using the Act to 
preclude foreclosure because Plaintiff knew from the beginning that Defendant was 
unregistered. However, cases applying similar statutes from other jurisdictions are 
relatively uniform that an wllicensed contractor may not foreclose a lien or maintain a 
claim or counterclaim against a landowner, even if the landowner was fully aware of the 
contractor's unlicensed status. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in 
rejecting an unlicensed contractor's estoppel argument, stated the following: 
As a matter of public policy, an unlicensed contractor may not retain 
payments made pursuant to a contract which requires him to perform in 
violation of the Construction Industries Licensing Act. This is true even if, 
as here, the consumer has knowledge that the contractor is unlicensed. The 
public policy behind the licensing requirement of the Act is so strong that 
the element of consumer knowledge is of no consequence in our decision. 
iVlascarenas v. Jaramillo, 111 N.M. 410, 414, 806 P.2d 59, 63 (1991). 
Similarly, the California Supreme Court, sitting in banc, held as follows: 
Regardless of the equities, section 7031 bars all actions, however they 
are characterized, which effectively seek "compensation" for illegal 
unlicensed contract work. Thus, an unlicensed contractor cannot recover 
either for the agreed contract price or for the reasonable value of labor and 
materials. The statutory prohibition operates even where the person for 
whom the work was performed knew the contractor was unlicensed. 
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It follows that an unlicensed contractor may not circumvent the clear 
provisions and purposes of section 7031 simply by alleging that when the 
illegal contract was made, the other party had no intention of performing. 
Section 7031 places the risk of such bad faith squarely on the unlicensed 
contractor's shoulders. "Knowing that they will receive no help from the 
courts and must trust completely to each other's goodfaith, the parties are 
less likely to enter an illegal arrangement in the first place." 
Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 376,376 (Cal. 1991) 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
The Idaho Legislature has made clear that the purpose of the Act is to protect the 
public from "incompetent, dishonest, or unprincipled practitioners of construction." I.c. 
§ 52-5402. To effectuate this purpose, the Legislature enacted a series of registration 
requirements and penalties for their violation. As stated in Wagner v. Graham, 296 S.c. 
1, 3, 370 S.E.2d 95, 96 (1988), "[iJf one might avoid the impact of the statute by applying 
the law of estoppel, one could, by a similar reasoning, avoid the act by agreement 
between the Contractor and Homeowner ... [c ]learly this would not be allowed." 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's estoppel argument as to Plaintiff is 
unavailing. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's claim for foreclosure of a lien for work performed while unregistered 
is not allowed by the Act, nor may Defendant proceed under the theories of substantial 
compliance or estoppel. However, the Court finds that I.C. § 54-5201 et seq. does not 
preclude Defendant from foreclosing a lien for work performed while registered. Under § 
54-5217, a registered contractor is not precluded from bringing an action to foreclose a 
lien for "the performance of such act or contract" while the contractor was registered. 
While recovery under Defendant's action to foreclose its lien may be significantly limited 
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under the facts of this matter, it is not precluded. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment seeking a discharge of the lien is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this _ day of October, 2009. 
JOEL E. TINGEY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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